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Abstract 
In an aging society, income inequality persists as a severe social problem. Many factors bring about 
income inequality. Our paper presents consideration of intergenerational mobility and income 
inequality. Children can not obtain an education investment from their parents if the parents are poor. 
However, children that are reared by rich parents have a high probability of becoming skilled workers 
because of sufficient education investment without expending a large amount of effort. Not only 
education subsidies, but also postponing retirement timing and an increase in pension benefit increase 
the effort to become a skilled laborer. Therefore the intergenerational mobility from poor to the rich is 
increased. This paper presents an examination of the effects of an aging population on 
intergenerational mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Data show that income inequality, 
as represented by the Gini coefficient, increased during 1985–2011 in OECD countries.1 The OECD 
data show that inequality between a low income group and other income groups increases. Income 
inequality is resolved by a redistribution policy or education policy. If parents are poor, their children 
are unable to obtain a sufficient level of education investment. The children then can not obtain 
sufficient wage income as skilled workers because of a lack of education. This is intergenerational 
immobilization of the hierarchy. However, by virtue of adequate policy, we can obtain results by which 
intergenerational mobility is facilitated by a decrease in income inequality or in the poverty rate. 
Many related studies have examined income inequality. Based on Maoz and Moav (1999), 
Nakamura and Murayama (2011) derive the dynamics of income inequality and intergenerational 
mobility and the effect of technological changes on inequality. Hassler, Mora, and Zeira (2007) set a 
model with intergenerational mobility and derive wage inequality as strongly correlated with 
intergenerational mobility. 
This paper sets a model with intergenerational mobility and uses it to examine how a policy such 
as redistribution policy affects intergenerational mobility. Similarly to Owen and Weil (1998), we 
endogenize education investment by parents in children and examine education subsidies to ascertain 
whether intergenerational mobility is facilitated or not. Iyigun (1999) examines effect of public 
education on intergenerational mobility. This paper is based on private education that is partially 
subsidized. 
In addition, this paper presents examination of how an increase in pension benefits affects 
intergenerational mobility. Le Garrec (2015) derives that education investment increases if the pension 
benefit depends on the wage level. Our paper presents examination of the model with intergenerational 
mobility. 
Moreover, this paper presents an examination of the effects of postponing retirement timing. 
As described by Hirazawa and Yakita (2017) and others, many related papers examine the effects of 
elderly laborers on macroeconomic variables. Our paper presents an examination of how postponing 
retirement affects intergenerational mobility. Moreover, we give some consideration to policy 
variables that are given exogenously. One can regard endogenous variables as political equilibrium, 
as demonstrated by Arawatari and Ono (2013). 
The results obtained through his study are the following. Postponing retirement raises the number 
of skilled workers. Then intergenerational mobility increases. The intergenerational mobility is 
facilitated if the pension benefit depends on the wage level in the working generation. 
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 explains the model. Section 3 
                                                     
1 Data: OECD Statistics. 
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examines effects of postponing retirement. Sections 4 and 5 respectively present examinations of the 
effects of the education subsidy and pension. The final section concludes our manuscript. 
 
2. Model 
Labor of two types is used: skilled labor and unskilled labor. The wages of skilled laborers and 
unskilled laborers are represented respectively by 𝑤௦  and 𝑤௨  . Our paper assumes a small open 
economy in which the wage rate and interest rate are given exogenously. 
Individuals can live in childhood and in adulthood. However, during the old period, there exist 
individuals who can not live during the old period. Our paper presents consideration of the survival 
rate 𝑝 as life expectancy (0 < 𝑝 < 1 ). Individuals devote attention to education investment for 
children 𝑒௧ and consumption during the old period 𝑐௧ାଵ. However, in childhood, the individuals have 
disutility for education effort. 
Our paper assumes no population growth and sets the population size as unity. Then, the utility 
function is assumed as 
𝑢௧ = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑒௧ + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛𝑐௧ାଵ − 𝜙𝑣௧, 0 < 𝛼 < 1. (1) 
The −𝜙𝑣௧ value represents disutility for educational effort. Also, 𝑣௧ is assumed as 
𝑣௧ = 𝑎 − 𝑒௧ିଵ. (2) 
Therein, 𝑒௧ିଵ denotes the education investment from the parents. Also, a expresses education effort, 
which differs among individuals. For these analyses, we assume that education effort a is distributed 
by the uniform distribution between [0, 𝑎ത]. 
If the individuals decide to consume education time, then 𝜙 = 1 is given. Otherwise, 𝜙 = 0. 
The budget constraint in the young period is presented as 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௜ = 𝑠௧ + (1 − 𝑥)𝑒௧ିଵ, 𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝑢. (3) 
As shown there, 𝑠௧ represents saving for consumption during the old period. 𝜏 stands for the income 
tax rate. The government collects tax revenues with income taxation and provides an education subsidy 
(subsidy rate: 𝑥) and pension benefit 𝑝௧ାଵ.  The budget constraint for the older period is 
𝑅𝑠௧ + 𝑝௧ାଵ = 𝑐௧ାଵ. (4) 
In that equation, 𝑅 signifies the interest rate of an annuity. If the interest rate is given by 𝑟 and the 
capital income and saving that deceased people have are distributed equally among older people, then 
𝑅 = ଵା௥
௣
 is obtainable. The lifetime budget constraint is 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௜ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
𝑅௧ାଵ
= (1 − 𝑥)𝑒௧ିଵ +
𝑐௧ାଵ
𝑅௧ାଵ
. (5) 
Without policies, 𝑥 = 0, 𝜏 = 0, 𝑝௧ାଵ = 0, the household optimal allocations are 
𝑒௧ =
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝑤௜ , (6) 
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𝑐௧ାଵ =
𝑅𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝑤௜ . (7) 
To be a skilled laborer, individuals must expend education effort a. Otherwise, the individuals must 
work as unskilled laborers. If the individual works as a skilled laborer, then the utility is 
𝑢௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛𝑤௦ + 𝛼𝑙𝑛
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛
𝑅𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
− ൫𝑎 − 𝑒௧ିଵ௜ ൯, 
(8) 
However, if the individuals work as unskilled laborers, then the utility is 
𝑢௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛𝑤௨ + 𝛼𝑙𝑛
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛
𝑅𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
, (9) 
As long as 𝑢௧௨ < 𝑢௧௦, the individuals expend the effort for education. However, whether the individuals 
pay for educational effort or not depends on the education investment from parents 𝑒௧ିଵ௜ . 
If the parents work as skilled laborers, then indifference a to becoming a skilled laborer or 
unskilled laborer is represented as 
𝑎௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝑤௦ . (10) 
If the parents work as unskilled laborers, then indifference a to being a skilled laborer or unskilled 
laborer is given such that the following equation holds: 
𝑎௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝑤௨ . (11) 
The share of ௔೟
ೞ
௔ത
 of the children among parents who work as skilled laborers work as skilled laborers; 
the share of ௔തି௔೟
ೞ
௔ത
 work as unskilled laborers. However, the share of ௔೟
ೠ
௔ത
 of children of parents who 
work as unskilled laborers work as skilled laborers. The share of ௔തି௔೟
ೠ
௔ത
 work as unskilled laborers. 
We derive how an increase in 𝑝 affects an aging population. We can obtain the following 
condition to obtain ௗ௔೟
೔
ௗ௣
. 
𝑝 >
ඨ
𝛼𝑤௜
𝑙𝑛 𝑤
௦
𝑤௨
1 − 𝛼
−
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
, 𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝑢 
(12) 
An increase in 𝑝 raises demand for education because an increase in 𝑝 increases the utility from 
consumption that is given by the wage rate. However, an increase in 𝑝 decreases the relative share of 
education investment from parents. These two countervailing effects derive the condition represented 
as (12). 
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3. Elderly labor 
If the household works not only in adulthood but also during the old period, how does the skilled 
laborer share change? The budget constraint in the old period changes to the following: 
𝑅𝑠௧ + 𝜆𝑤௜ = 𝑐௧ାଵ. (13) 
For simplicity, we omit the pension benefit 𝑝௧ାଵ. In the equation, 𝜆 denotes the length of elderly 
labor within 0 < λ < 1. This setting is the same as that used by Kunze (2014), Tanaka (2017) and 
others. Then, the lifetime budget constraint is given as 
൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௜ = 𝑒௧ +
𝑐௧ାଵ
𝑅
. (14) 
If the individual works as a skilled laborer, then the utility is given as 
𝑢௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛 ൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௦ + 𝛼𝑙𝑛
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛
𝑅𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
− ൫𝑎 − 𝑒௧ିଵ௜ ൯. 
(15) 
However, if the individuals work as an unskilled laborer, then the utility is given as 
𝑢௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛 ൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௨ + 𝛼𝑙𝑛
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
+ 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)𝑙𝑛
𝑅𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
. 
(16) 
As long as 𝑢௧௨ < 𝑢௧௦, the individuals expend the effort for education. However, whether the individuals 
pay for education effort or not depends on the education investment from the parents 𝑒௧ିଵ௜ ., which is 
given as 
𝑒௧ିଵ௜ =
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௜ . (17) 
If the parents work as skilled laborers, then indifference a to becoming a skilled laborer or unskilled 
laborer is given such that the following equation holds: 
𝑎௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௦ . (18) 
If parents work as unskilled laborers, then indifference a to becoming skilled laborers or unskilled 
laborers is given as 
𝑎௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௨ . (19) 
Thanks to 𝜆, both 𝑎௧௦ and 𝑎௧௨ increase: the share of skilled laborer nevertheless raises the type of 
parents. 
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4. Education subsidy 
The government budget constraint is presented below. 
τ(𝑤௦ 𝐿௧௦ + 𝑤௨ 𝐿௧௨) = 𝑥(𝑒௧௦𝐿௧௦ + 𝑒௧௨𝐿௧௨), (20) 
As shown there, 𝐿௧௦ and 𝐿௧௨ respectively denote skilled and unskilled workers. Then, 𝑎௧௦ and 𝑎௧௨ 
change to the following: 
𝑎௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
1 − 𝜏
1 − 𝑥
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
𝑤௦ . (21) 
𝑎௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௧௦
𝑤௧௨
+
1 − 𝜏
1 − 𝑥
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
൬1 +
𝜆
𝑅
൰ 𝑤௧௨. (22) 
Differentiation of ଵିఛ
ଵି௫
 with respect to 𝑥 is reduced to 1 − ௗఛ
ௗ௫
 at the approximation of 𝑥 = 0 and 
we can obtain the results that an increase in 𝑥  raises 𝑎௧௦  and 𝑎௧௨  because 
ௗఛ
ௗ௫
= ఈ
ఈା௣(ଵିఈ)
< 1 . 
Therefore, the subsidy for education raises the share of skilled laborers among parents of both types. 
 
5. Pension 
The government provides a pension policy and education subsidy with a balanced budget. The 
government budget constraint is given as 
τ(𝑤௦ 𝐿௧௦ + 𝑤௨ 𝐿௧௨) = 𝑝𝑝௧ାଵ. (23) 
We can consider pension benefits of two types: Beverage type pension and Bismarkian type pension. 
The Beverage type pension is a pension benefit that is distributed equally irrespective of the income 
level. 
𝑝௧ାଵ =
τ(𝑤௦ 𝐿௧௦ + 𝑤௨ 𝐿௧௨)
𝑝
. (24) 
Then, the lifetime budget constraint is given as 
(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௜ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
𝑅
= 𝑒௧ +
𝑐௧ାଵ
𝑅
. (25) 
Then, 𝑎௧௦ and 𝑎௧௨ change to the following. 
𝑎௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
ቆ(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௦ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
𝑅
ቇ. (26) 
𝑎௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
ቆ(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௨ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
𝑅
ቇ. (27) 
Actually, 𝑎௧௨ rises because the net pension benefit of unskilled laborer always rises by virtue of the 
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redistribution from skilled laborers.2 However, skilled laborers’ net pension benefit can not rise. 
Therefore, 𝑎௧௦ is reduced.3 
We consider the Bismarkian pension as the other type of pension. Consequently, the government 
budget constraints are 
𝑝௧ାଵ௦ =
τ𝑤௦ 𝐿௧௦
𝑝𝐿௧ିଵ௦
. (28) 
𝑝௧ାଵ௨ =
τ𝑤௦ 𝐿௧௨
𝑝𝐿௧ିଵ௨
. (29) 
The lifetime budget constraint is 
൭1 + 𝜏 ቆ
𝐿௧௦
𝑝𝐿௧ିଵ௦
1
𝑅
− 1ቇ൱ 𝑤௦ = 𝑒௧ +
𝑐௧ାଵ
𝑅
. (30) 
൭1 + 𝜏 ቆ
𝐿௧௦
𝑝𝐿௧ିଵ௦
1
𝑅
− 1ቇ൱ 𝑤௨ = 𝑒௧ +
𝑐௧ାଵ
𝑅
. (31) 
Then, 𝑎௧௦ and 𝑎௧௨ change to the following: 
𝑎௧௦ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
൭(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௦ + 𝜏
𝐿௧௦
𝑝𝐿௧ିଵ௦
𝑤௦
𝑅
൱. (32) 
𝑎௧௨ = ൫𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)൯𝑙𝑛
𝑤௦
𝑤௨
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝑝(1 − 𝛼)
൭(1 − 𝜏)𝑤௨ + 𝜏
𝐿௧௨
𝑝𝐿௧ିଵ௨
𝑤௨
𝑅
൱. (33) 
However, if ௅೟
ೞ
௣௅೟షభ
ೞ
ଵ
ோ
− 1 > 0, then an increase in contribution rate 𝜏 increases 𝑎௧௦ and 𝑎௧௨ because 
the education investment increases. However, if 𝐿௧௦ = 𝐿௧ିଵ௦  and 𝐿௧௨ = 𝐿௧ିଵ௨  as the equilibrium in the 
long run, we obtain ଵ
௣ோ
− 1 < 0. Therefore, an increase in 𝜏 reduces 𝑎௧௦ and 𝑎௧௨. 
 
6. Conclusions 
For the analyses explained in this paper, we set a model with intergenerational mobility and income 
inequality. Many papers have described research related to this topic. In contrast to them, our paper 
presents examination of how an aging population and the policy affect intergenerational mobility. An 
aging population can provide increased numbers of skilled workers. However, because of a decrease 
in education investment from parents to children, an aging population might reduce the skilled workers. 
Postponement of retirement raises the share of skilled workers because the education investment 
                                                     
2 With differentiation (1 − 𝜏)𝑤௨ + ௣೟శభ
ோ
 with respect to 𝜏 at the approximation of 𝜏 = 0, we obtain the 
condition to increase (1 − 𝜏)𝑤௨ + ௣೟శభ
ோ
 as 
ೢೞ
ೢೠ
௅೟ೞା௅೟ೠ
ଵା௥
> 1. With 
ೢೞ
ೢೠ
௅೟ೞା௅೟ೠ
ଵା௥
> 1, we can obtain ௗ௔೟
ೠ
ௗఛ
> 0.  
3 With differentiation (1 − 𝜏)𝑤௦ + ௣೟శభ
ோ
 with respect to 𝜏 at the approximation of 𝜏 = 0, we obtain 
௅೟ೞା
ೢೠ
ೢೞ
௅೟ೠ
ଵା௥
< 1. Then, 𝑎௧௦ decreases.  
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increases the lifetime wage income. Moreover, by providing the pension benefit, many individuals 
who have unskilled laborers as parents can become skilled laborers. As demonstrated by the analyses 
presented in this paper, instead of an education subsidy to increase skilled workers, these policies can 
raise the share of skilled workers. 
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